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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Daniel Chovan was convicted in California state court of a
misdemeanor that did not involve a gun.1 After inflicting corporal
injury on his spouse, Cheryl Fix, he was sentenced to 120 days in jail
and three years of supervised release.2 Although Chovan did not use
a firearm in committing the offense, he was banned from possessing a
gun for the rest of his life under a federal statute applicable only to
persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes.3
Chovan challenged the law as an unconstitutional infringement of his
Second Amendment rights.4 In evaluating Chovan’s case, the Ninth
Circuit was faced with a problem: what standard of review should
apply to Chovan’s constitutional claim?5 Absent clear guidance from
the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit was left to choose its own
standard.6 Even though the Ninth Circuit found that the federal
statute substantially burdened Chovan’s Second Amendment rights, it
opted to grant the federal government moderate deference, and
applied intermediate scrutiny.7 After examining the regulation
through this lens, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute was
constitutional.8 Thus, without any approval from the Supreme Court

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1129–30.
Id. at 1134.
See id.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1130, 1142.
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regarding its methodology, the Chovan court both independently
selected a standard of review for a constitutional challenge and
upheld severely burdensome legislation by virtue of its choice.
Chovan is not an isolated example of constitutional confusion. In
fact, it is simply the most recent example of the legal debate
surrounding the proper standard of review for the Second
Amendment.
The proper analytical framework for statutes
challenged as an unconstitutional infringement on individual Second
Amendment rights after District of Columbia v. Heller has emerged
as both a hotly contested and imprecise zone of jurisprudence for
lower courts.9 As an increasing number of Second Amendment cases
wend through the federal system, these courts have been faced with
two types of challenged gun statutes. This Note defines those two
types as statutes that “prohibit” and those that “limit.” “Prohibiting”
statutes constitute blanket bans on certain weapons or materials, and
include regulations like the District of Columbia (District) handgun
ban struck down in Heller.10 “Limiting” statutes create regulations on
certain types of weapons or related activities, such as concealed carry
laws or purchase restrictions.11 Prohibiting statutes are immediately
more suspect after Heller, which explicitly decried legislation
“ban[ning] . . . an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen
by American society” as an unconstitutional restriction on the right to
keep and bear arms.12 But because the Court failed to specify a level
of scrutiny for Second Amendment claims in any form, ruling upon
both types of legislation has presented a complicated task for lower
courts.13
In Heller’s wake, two opposing points of view have emerged
regarding its proper application in both categorizing statutes affecting
the Second Amendment and in classifying their constitutionality.
Part I of this Note traces the development of the Supreme Court’s
approach to the Second Amendment both before and immediately
after the Heller decision. Part II examines the evolution of Second
Amendment jurisprudence since Heller, and posits that legislation
regulating high-capacity magazines represents a markedly gray area
for judges outlining the contours of the right to keep and bear arms.
Part II also outlines the analytical options for courts faced with

9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Heller I).
10. See id. at 573.
11. Cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, Administering the Second Amendment: Law,
Politics, and Taxonomy, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2010).
12 554 U.S. at 628; cf. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1264.
13. 554 U.S. at 634–35.
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Second Amendment challenges that have developed since Heller.
The majority of courts faced with Second Amendment issues have
opted to pursue a two-step, balancing analysis. First, courts choosing
this method decide whether the statute regulates conduct that falls
within the scope of the Second Amendment.14 If so, the court then
engages in some level of heightened scrutiny of the regulation, which
emerges almost invariably as a type of intermediate scrutiny.15
Alternatively, a small group of justices led by Judge Brett Kavanaugh
of the D.C. Circuit16 have rejected the use of balancing tests as
inconsistent with Heller. Instead, these judges rely upon the
“common use test” delineated in Heller, and employ an evaluation of
the text, history, and tradition of the challenged statute and the
Second Amendment.17
Part III of this Note uses high-capacity magazine regulations as a
test case for the application of both methodologies, and finds that the
approach recommended by Judge Kavanaugh is the preferable
option. Because the Kavanaugh approach avoids the judicial interestbalancing so disfavored by the Supreme Court in Second Amendment
cases, this Note concludes that Judge Kavanaugh’s analysis is the
proper choice for courts faced with Second Amendment challenges.
This Note arrives at this result because the Kavanaugh approach is
flexible, predictable, easy to apply, and faithful to the core principles
articulated by the Supreme Court.
I. THE CONTOURS OF MODERN SECOND AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE: FROM MILLER TO HELLER
A. Second Amendment Jurisprudence Before 2008
The words of Heller are familiar to all Second Amendment
scholars, although they have managed to produce a breathtaking
divergence of interpretation. Before Heller’s issuance in 2008, courts
interpreted Second Amendment cases almost solely through the lens
of the canonical case United States v. Miller.18 In Miller, the U.S.

14. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
15. See, e.g., id. at 97. Courts utilizing an interest-balancing test must necessarily
apply some form of heightened scrutiny because Heller rejected the use of rational
basis review for Second Amendment cases. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
16. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Ill.
2012).
18. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
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Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the interstate
transport of short-barreled shotguns, declaring that possession or use
of this type of firearm bore “no reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”19 The Miller
Court determined that the Second Amendment should be interpreted
and applied with a careful eye to the continuation and effectiveness of
state militias.20 Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, defined
a militia as “comprised [of] all males physically capable of acting in
concert for the common defense” who were “expected to appear
bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use
at the time.”21 As such, lower court opinions expound upon the
connection between the Second Amendment and its historical
application to the state militias referenced in Miller, and generally
limit the scope of weapons protected under the amendment to those
generally utilized at the time of its passage.22 However, the Miller
opinion was also notoriously “opaque and open-ended,” and seemed
to raise more questions than it answered about the scope of the
Second Amendment.23
For the next seven decades, state and federal courts failed to agree
upon a uniform evaluation of Miller’s meaning.24 Some embraced a
“state’s right” theory, interpreting Miller to mean that the Second
Amendment protected states in the maintenance of their militias
against possible interference by the federal government.25 These
courts held that individuals lack standing to challenge gun legislation,
because an individual right to keep and bear arms does not exist.26
Other courts, in contrast, adopted a “collective right” approach, and
held that the Second Amendment protected only the collective
possession of arms bearing a reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.27

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
See Brannon Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L.
REV. 961, 975–76 (1996).
23. See Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of
Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 353 (2009).
24. Id. at 354.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).
26. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003).
27. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Most courts considering the issue utilized some form of rational
basis review when evaluating firearm regulations.28 Gun regulations
were upheld in almost every instance in the wake of the Miller
decision.29 But historical interpretation of Miller did not garner
universal acceptance. For instance, scholar Brannon Denning argued
over ten years before the Heller decision that applying Miller to deny
an individual’s right to keep and bear firearms “strayed so far from
the Court’s original holding to the point of being intellectually
dishonest.”30
If the Court truly intended to limit the use and
possession of firearms to a militia, Denning contended, the case
would have been disposed of on standing grounds, because the
defendants in the case were not militia members.31 Had the Miller
Court foreclosed an individual right to bear arms, he argued, the
replacement of state militias with the National Guard would render
the Second Amendment, like the Third Amendment, “little more
than an anachronistic curiosity.”32
B.

District of Columbia v. Heller: A Novel Approach

Faced with the opportunity to redraw the boundaries of the Second
Amendment, the Heller Court put some of the questions raised by
Miller to rest and issued the seminal decision regarding prohibition
statutes under the Second Amendment.33 Petitioner Dick Heller
challenged a District law prohibiting the registration of handguns and
requiring residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and
disassembled or bound by trigger lock or a similar device.34 Relying
primarily on First Amendment jurisprudence, the Government
recommended that the Supreme Court adopt a standard of
intermediate scrutiny when evaluating gun control legislation.35 At

28. Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and
McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1136 (2011).
29. Id. at 1134 (citing Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105
MICH. L. REV. 683, 718 (2007)).
30. Denning, supra note 22, at 962–63.
31. Id. at 975.
32. Id. at 996.
33. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2010) (holding that “[t]here seems to us no doubt,
on the basis of text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms”); see Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of
Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1618 (2012).
34. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 570. The law also made it a crime to carry an unlicensed
handgun, but authorized the police chief to issue one-year licenses to do so. Heller, a
special policeman, applied to register a handgun to keep in his home, but the District
denied his request.
35. Lund, supra note 33, at 1618.
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oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts expressed skepticism that a
balancing test was appropriate for Second Amendment analysis,
stating:
[T]hese various phrases under the different standards that are
proposed, “compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly
tailored,” none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder
why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard.
Isn’t it enough to determine the scope of the existing right that the
amendment refers to, look at the various regulations that were
available at the time, including you can’t take the gun to the
marketplace and all that, and determine how . . . . this restriction and
the scope of this right looks in relation to those? I’m not sure why
we have to articulate some very intricate standard. I mean, these
standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind of developed
over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked
up. But I don’t know why when we are starting afresh, we would try
to articulate a whole standard that would apply in every case?36

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reflected Justice Roberts’s
concern and declined to articulate a standard to be applied in every
Second Amendment case.37 Nor did the Court establish any
consistent standard to be utilized when evaluating the right to keep
and bear arms.
Rather than articulate a standard of review for the Second
Amendment, the Heller Court instead struck down the District’s
regulation because it prohibited an entire class of firearms
overwhelmingly chosen by Americans for the lawful purpose of selfdefense.38 The Court reached this conclusion by engaging in “the
most exacting historical inquiry into any question concerning the right
to keep and bear arms.”39 Justice Scalia concluded that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense by exhaustively examining three distinct sources: the
amendment’s text, the history behind its enactment, and its traditional

36. Id. at 1618-19 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller I, 554 U.S.
570 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/07-290.pdf).
37. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
38. See Lund, supra note 33, at 1619.
39. Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 861–62 (2013).
The Heller decision has also been characterized by scholars as one of the most
exacting exercises of originalism ever undertaken by the Supreme Court. See, .e.g.,
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein,
Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 249
(2008).
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interpretation.40 The challenged statute, he opined, did not require
the application of any standard of scrutiny traditionally applied to
enumerated constitutional rights (rational basis review, intermediate
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny), because it would fail them all.41 He
further classified rational basis review (the standard favored by courts
in the wake of Miller) as particularly inappropriate, arguing that
[Rational basis review] could not be used to evaluate the extent to
which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right . . . . If
all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant
with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and
would have no effect.42

By engaging in a textual, historical, and traditional method of
analysis, rather than adhering to the open-ended balancing test
recommended by the government, Heller also implicitly rejected the
application of intermediate or strict scrutiny to prohibition cases.43
C.

Heller’s Limits: Presumptively Lawful Regulations and the
Common Use Test

The Heller majority dismissed the notion of an unlimited Second
Amendment right.44 Two primary restrictions upon the right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense emerge from the decision, both hinging
upon the amendment’s history, traditional application, and
interpretation. The first restriction preserves a set of “longstanding”
prohibitions on firearm possession, which Justice Scalia categorized as
“presumptively lawful.”45 The opinion specifically includes in this
category “prohibitions on [possession] by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.”46 Scalia was careful to note that the list of presumptively
lawful regulations was not exhaustive, leaving room for additions or

40. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 595; Miller, supra note 39, at 856. Justice Scalia further
described this right as reaching its apex in the home. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628.
41. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
42. Id. at 628 n.27.
43. See E. Garret Barlow, United States v. Reese and Post-Heller Second
Amendment Interpretation, 2012 BYU L. REV. 391, 405; Lund, supra note 33, at
1628.
44. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626.
45. Id. at 626–27 n.26; see Alexander C. Barrett, Taking Aim at Felony
Possession, 93 B.U. L. REV. 163, 171–72 (2013).
46. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
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slight alterations.47 As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the
existence of this list appears to foreclose the application of strict
scrutiny to laws burdening individual Second Amendment rights.48
The majority’s explicit approval of a given set of regulations “whose
constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from
clear,” he argued, would make the true application of strict scrutiny to
Second Amendment cases “impossible.”49 Breyer sharply criticized
the majority’s failure to articulate a standard, and rejected Scalia’s
focus on text, history, and tradition.50 Further, he recommended that
the Court employ an interest-balancing inquiry in Second
Amendment cases similar to the type utilized in free speech and
election law cases.51
The second limitation articulated in Heller delineates the scope of
weapons protected under the Second Amendment.52 To honor the
historical restriction on the possession of “dangerous and unusual
weapons,” the Court upheld the common use standard first described
in Miller.53 Thus, “the Second Amendment does not protect those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.”54 The precise meaning of the common use exception has
become a topic of heated scholarly debate that implicates the vast
advancement in firearms technology in previous centuries.55 Initially
troubling is the proper definition of the phrase “at the time,” which
could refer to two acceptable periods: the time of ratification of the
Second Amendment or the modern day.56 Justice Scalia eliminated
the first option in short order:
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only
those arms that existed in the [eighteenth] century are protected by
the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
Id. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 686–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id. at 625.
See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1387–88 (2009); Michael S. Obermeier, Scoping Out the Limits
of “Arms” Under the Second Amendment, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 681, 683 (2012); Mark
Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and
Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1439–40 (2009).
56. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1387; see also Allen Rostron, Justice
Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 703, 710–11 (2012).
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that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of
communications, and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern
forms of search, the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not
in existence at the time of the founding.57

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the Second Amendment
quite clearly extends to protect modern weapons. To rule otherwise
would be to accept the absurd logic that “the ‘Armies’ Congress is
authorized to raise can consist only of infantry marching on foot with
antique black powder muskets . . . [a]nd the ‘Navy’ . . . that Congress
is authorized to maintain would be a fleet of wooden sailing ships.”58
D. Complications Posed by the Common Use Test
Although the common use test seems to refer to weapons and
technologies commonly owned in the modern day, this premise raises
some critical complications. First, who is the common user?
American military organizations often use weapons that private
citizens are unable to own or obtain for either home or public use.59
This has led some scholars to argue that current military utility should
serve as “both a necessary and sufficient” test for the constitutional
protection of hand-carried weapons.60 Others argue that protected
firearms should be both appropriate for military use, but also for
common use by private citizens.61 The Supreme Court seemed to
resolve this question in Heller by categorizing the common use
exception as a “gloss on the historical tradition of prohibiting the
carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.”62 The Court rejected
the notion that the common user includes military organizations, a
criterion it characterized as “startling” in its implications, and held
that the arms protected by the Second Amendment are those in

57. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 582 (internal citations omitted).
58. Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1387.
59. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water (Mark)?
Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245,
1255 n.66 (2009); O’Shea, supra note 23, at 359.
60. See O’Shea, supra note 23, at 359.
61. See id. During oral argument in Heller, Justice Scalia expressed preference
for this kind of two-step analysis, though it was not ultimately adopted in the case.
See id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Heller I, 554 U.S. at 570 (No. 07290), available at www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07290.pdf).
62. O’Shea, supra note 23, at 368.
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common use at the present time for both inherently private selfdefense and “other lawful purposes.”63
The second complication raised by the common use test’s
engagement with the present period is what scholars deem the
“circularity problem.”64 By permitting national popularity and
frequency of use to dictate a class of protected arms, the common use
test “effectively empowers the government to create its own
exceptions to the Second Amendment right so long as the Supreme
Court waits awhile after the banning of a weapon before it checks to
see whether such weapons are in common civilian use.”65 It also
permits the government to automatically place new technologies
outside of the reach of the Second Amendment through severely
restrictive regulations or bans that eliminate the possibility for that
technology to ever become “common.”66 Thus, the test makes the
ability to possess novel firearm technology subject to the “good faith
of the legislature”—despite the fact that the premise of the Second
Amendment is to prevent free people from being wrongfully deprived
of arms by the government.67
Despite the problems it generates, the common use formula does
establish a relatively narrow and well-defined class of protected
firearms, excluding most military arms and large-scale deadly
weapons.68 Further, because the Heller Court built upon Miller’s
holding that gun possession must further the “lawful purpose” of self-

63. Id. at 367–68 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25). The Heller majority
offered the example of machine guns to support the alarming nature of the idea of
including military organizations as “common users.” Heller I, 554 U.S. at 624.
Protecting military equipment useful in warfare would mean that the Second
Amendment protected machine guns, which would render unconstitutional the
National Firearms Act’s prohibition on such fully automatic weapons (a provision not
challenged in Miller). See id.
64. See Proposals to Reduce Gun Violence: Protecting Our Communities While

Respecting the Second Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 13–14 (2013) (statement of Laurence Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor,
Harvard Law Sch.); Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1411; Darrell A.H. Miller,

Analogies and Institutions in the First and Second Amendments: A Response to
Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. 137, 142 n.28 (2013); O’Shea, supra note 23, at
384-86.
65. Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1411.
66. Id.
67. O’Shea, supra note 23, at 385.
68. Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the

Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist
Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1292 (2009). The handgun, by contrast, is “the
quintessential self-defense weapon . . . [and] the most popular weapon chosen by
Americans for self-defense in the home.” Heller I, 554 U.S. 629.
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defense, “[b]y definition, any device that would destroy both the selfdefender and the attacker in situations satisfying the imminent threat
requirement [of self-defense is] outside the envelope.”69 While
Justice Scalia conceded that a modern militia would necessarily
require more sophisticated weapons than those from the eighteenth
century, he adhered to the traditional notion that “the fact that
modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the
prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our
interpretation of that right.”70 In any event, he concluded, the
handgun’s popularity for American self-defense in the home rendered
at least the District ban invalid.71
Taken as a whole, the Heller decision establishes three critical
propositions: first, that individuals have a constitutional right to
protect themselves with usable firearms, and that this right is at its
strongest in the home; second, that some burdens upon individual
Second Amendment rights are presumptively lawful; and third, that
the amendment does not protect dangerous or unusual weapons.72
The first proposition has been termed “the Heller core” by scholars,
and is widely accepted in both academia and lower courts.73 The
second two have faced disparate interpretation, in part due to the
Court’s failure to articulate a clear standard of review.
II. CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND THE U NIQUE C HALLENGES P OSED BY H IGH-C APACITY
MAGAZINE LEGISLATION
A. Expanding Heller to the States: McDonald v. City of Chicago
After Heller, courts were understandably confused. The Supreme
Court’s shift from Miller to Heller left judges mired in an adjusted
view of the Second Amendment, and they struggled to find a
workable way to apply the case to the increasing number of
constitutional challenges to gun laws. The Court attempted to clarify
Heller in the subsequent case of McDonald v. City of Chicago by
holding that the individual right to possess a handgun in the home for
self-defense applied to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment.74 The plaintiffs in McDonald challenged a Chicago
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Johnson, supra note 68, at 1292.
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 627–28.
See id. at 629.
See Kiehl, supra note 28, at 1143.

See id.
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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statute prohibiting individuals from possessing a handgun in the city
without a valid registration certificate.75 The same statute also
prohibited the registration of nearly all handguns in city limits, which
had the effect of banning handgun possession in Chicago.76 They
additionally challenged an Oak Park, Illinois law making it “unlawful
for any person to possess . . . any firearm.”77
Justice Alito’s majority opinion held that because the Second
Amendment is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”
it is fundamental and must be incorporated to apply against the states
under the Due Process Clause.78 Citing Heller, the McDonald
majority confirmed that “individual self-defense is ‘the central
component’ of the Second Amendment right . . . [and] ‘the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home.’”79
The Court also adopted the Heller Court’s careful examination of the
history and tradition of the Second Amendment, chronicling the
original understanding of everyone from American colonists to the
Framers and the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.80 At each
step in his analysis, Justice Alito reiterated the view that the right to
keep and bear arms is and always has been “among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”81
Writing also for the plurality, Justice Alito further refused to treat the
Second Amendment as a “second-class” right, distinct from other
portions of the Bill of Rights deemed worthy of incorporation.82
The McDonald Court, like the Heller Court, was careful to observe
the state’s right to reasonably burden individual Second Amendment
rights.83 For instance, Justice Alito specifically reaffirmed Justice
Scalia’s non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful” gun regulations,

75. Id. at 3026 (citing CHI., ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-20-050(a)–(c) (2009)).
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting OAK PARK, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 27-2-1 (2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
79. Id. at 3036 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
80. See id. at 3037–42.
81. Id. at 3042.
82. Id. at 3044 (plurality opinion). Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy
comprised the plurality opinion. Justice Thomas joined in the majority opinion,
agreeing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the
Second Amendment applicable to the states. Id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring).
But Thomas wrote separately to express his opinion that the Second Amendment
should be incorporated through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
83. See id. at 3046.
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stating that “[d]espite municipal respondents’ doomsday
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating
firearms.”84 However, he clearly articulated the suspect nature of
blanket bans, like those instituted by Chicago and Oak Park. While
the municipal respondents noted that courts had upheld several state
and local firearm laws, Justice Alito pointed out the “paucity of
precedent sustaining bans comparable to those at issue here and in
Heller.”85 Indeed, the municipal respondents in McDonald were able
to locate only a single case from the late twentieth century upholding
a ban similar to the one at issue.86
McDonald served largely to affirm the core principles of Heller’s
interpretation of the Second Amendment.87 The case also lent
approval to the historical inquiry the Heller Court utilized.88 But
Justice Alito failed to articulate a precise standard of review for
modern firearm legislation, the constitutionality of which remains
suspect after historical analysis.89 Despite this omission, Justice Alito
stated clearly that the Court likely would not consider interestbalancing to be the proper method of judicial review for gun
legislation.90 Evaluating the municipal respondents’ contention that
interest-balancing would be appropriate in this instance, Justice Alito
asserted that “[i]n Heller . . . we expressly rejected the argument that
the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by
judicial interest balancing.”91 Justice Alito additionally eliminated the
possibility of applying a “reasonableness” test, rejecting the municipal
respondents’ argument that state and local governments should be
able to “enact any gun control law they deem to be reasonable.”92
Thus, after McDonald, both interest-balancing and reasonableness
inquiries (like the rational basis test), are inappropriate when
evaluating the contours of the right to keep and bear arms.

84. Id. at 3047. Justice Alito additionally cited Heller’s statement that the right
extends to handguns because they are “overwhelmingly chosen by American society
for [the] lawful purpose of self-defense,” implicitly supporting the common use test.
Id. (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628).
85. Id.
86. See id. (pointing to municipal respondents’ citation of Kalodimos v. Morton
Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984)).
87. See Kiehl, supra note 28, at 1139-40.
88. See id. at 1140.
89. See id. at 1141.
90. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 632–34 (2008)).
92. Id. at 3046 (citation omitted).
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Evolution of the Common Use Test After McDonald

The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the right to keep and bear
arms spawned a wealth of decisions evaluating the Second
Amendment in light of both the Heller core and its two articulated
exceptions. The first exception, Heller’s list of “presumptively
lawful” statutes, has provided something of a guidepost for courts to
follow when making constitutional determinations about gun laws,
even if placing a given statute into the “presumptively lawful”
category occasionally takes some judicial wrangling.93 The second
exception—the common use test—is somewhat murkier to apply.
Nevertheless, the common use test is arguably more faithful to the
historical inquiry presented by the Heller Court, prompting a more
thorough review of the challenged statute and its purpose.
When choosing how to apply the common use test, courts must
determine whether the test reaches the challenged statute.94 Thus,
judges are generally required to place gun laws into one of two
categories to determine whether the common use test applies. The
first are “prohibition statutes,” or legislation that either bans or
constructively bans firearms themselves or an item critical to their
use.95 These laws fall well within the scope of the common use test
because they necessarily implicate an evaluation of whether the
banned firearm or equipment was in “common use” at the time the
Second Amendment was established.96 If so (assuming the statute is
not “presumptively lawful”), a ban would be unconstitutional. When
evaluated under the common use test, these cases are often the “easy
fits,” and a straightforward answer often emerges; blanket bans are
almost always impermissible.97 The most obviously problematic
prohibition statutes concern bans of commonly owned firearms, like
the laws struck down in Heller and McDonald.98 Other forms of
prohibition statutes could possibly be construed to include laws
requiring loaded chamber indicators, integral trigger locks, or other
mechanisms that severely diminish or eliminate the utility of the
93. Professor Darrell A.H. Miller has criticized what he considers to be the
“mechanical” application of Heller’s “presumptively lawful” categories in an attempt
to fit a challenged statute within one of them; this, he argues, undercuts the exacting
and individualized historical inquiry demanded by the Heller Court. Miller, supra
note 39, at 855.
94. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1273.
95. See id. at 1264.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. Commonly owned firearms include handguns and popular long guns,
the types of weapons that have been in existence in some form since the Framing. Id.
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firearm for self-defense.99 But the common use test is far from a
death knell to all laws banning guns or related equipment. For
instance, the test would uphold statutes prohibiting fully automatic
repeaters (true machine guns) because they have traditionally been
rare for civilian use and heavily restricted.100
The second category of restrictions that courts must consider under
Heller’s common use test are “limiting statutes,” which simply add
“regulatory friction” to legally keeping and bearing firearms.101
Examples include waiting periods, taxes and processing fees, and laws
like concealed carry restrictions that regulate possession outside of
the home.102 This type of legislation is often beyond the reach of the
common use test, because it does not directly prohibit a commonly
owned firearm.103 But limiting statutes necessarily fall along a sliding
scale, and some may present so much “friction” that they become
constitutionally problematic. For instance, legislation that effectively
eliminates the right to own a gun by employing an escalating series of
requirements, waiting periods, and taxes could so severely infringe on
the individual right to keep and bear arms in the aggregate as to be
unconstitutional, though courts have indicated that such limitations
may be tolerable as long as the core Second Amendment right is
respected.104 Limiting statutes create the most complicated issues for
courts applying the standard articulated by the Heller and McDonald
Courts.
C.

Popular Option: The Marzzarella Two-Step

Heller and McDonald prompted a veritable flood of Second
Amendment challenges.105 Left without a clearly articulated standard
of review to apply when deciding such issues, lower courts were
largely left to their own devices to fashion one. As a result, courts
faced with gun laws have employed everything from the rational basis
test106 to strict scrutiny107 in an attempt to determine an appropriate
99. See id. at 1264–65.
100. Johnson, supra note 68, at 1293.
101. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1274.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1273.
104. Id.
105. See Stacey L. Sobel, A Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do
Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 511 (2012).
106. See, e.g., Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, No. 2:09-CV-01235 MCE-DAD, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51906, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (utilizing the rational basis test to
deny plaintiff’s request for a concealed carry permit because the law at issue did not
“substantially burden” his Second Amendment rights). It is worth noting that Justice
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method of analysis. Some, like the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of
Chicago, have held that Heller and McDonald mandate the
application of “heightened scrutiny” to such legislation.108 Under
“heightened scrutiny,” the Seventh Circuit stated that the government
must establish a “strong public-interest justification” for the law in
question to be upheld.109 The government’s burden under this test is
not one traditionally associated with any established type of review.110
Such varied experimentation exemplifies lower courts’ deep
confusion when faced with Second Amendment challenges.
Many courts considering the issue have settled upon a self-designed
two-step inquiry when faced with legislation potentially impinging on
the right to keep and bear arms. This test was first laid out by the
Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.111 In Marzzarella, the
defendant was indicted for possession of a handgun with a partially
obliterated serial number in violation of federal law.112 The court
employed a dual-pronged test, which required it to first determine
“whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee;” if not, the
court’s inquiry would conclude.113 If so, the Third Circuit held, an
evaluating court should “evaluate the law under some form of meansend scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is
constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.”114 The most appropriate form
of means-end scrutiny (for both the Third Circuit and the majority of
courts utilizing this test) is most often an intermediate standard of

Scalia explicitly prohibited the use of the rational basis test for Second Amendment
cases. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
107. United States v. Ligon, No. 3:04-CR-00185-HDM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116272, at *16–17 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2010). Some scholars have advocated for Justice
Breyer’s view that it is doctrinally impossible to use strict scrutiny for the Second
Amendment while still honoring Heller’s “presumptively lawful” exception. See
Sobel, supra note 105, at 512 (citing Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search
of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
1371, 1379 (2009)).
108. 651 F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011). In Ezell, the Seventh Circuit struck down a
Chicago law requiring range training as a prerequisite to lawful gun ownership, while
simultaneously banning within city limits any range at which such training could take
place. Id. at 689–90.
109. Id. at 708–09. The court classified “heightened scrutiny” as more rigorous,
though not quite “strict scrutiny.” Id. at 708. The range ban, the Seventh Circuit
concluded, fell far short of meeting this standard. Id. at 709.
110. Sobel, supra note 105, at 513.
111. 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
112. Id. at 87.
113. Id. at 89.
114. Id.
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review, and the regulation must be “substantially related” to an
“important governmental interest” to be valid.115 Thus, the two-step
test established in Marzzarella and subsequently followed by several
circuits116 combines both a historical and an interest-balancing inquiry.
Courts employing this analysis are often required to determine
whether the common use test applies during the first step of the
Marzzarella test, where they must decide whether an individual’s
Second Amendment rights have been impermissibly burdened. In
doing so, this Note suggests that courts must at least implicitly
characterize the challenged statute as prohibiting or limiting.117 A
prohibiting statute will not survive application of the common use test
if the gun or equipment prohibited is popularly and historically
used.118 In contrast, a limiting statute will often fall beyond the reach
of the common use test,119 and thus stand a far better chance of
moving on to the second step of the Marzzarella method of analysis.
For instance, in Marzzarella, the Third Circuit cast the law banning
handguns without serial numbers as a type of prohibiting statute, but
held that it would not be protected under the common use test:
[S]erial numbers on firearms did not exist at the time of
ratification . . . . It would make little sense to categorically protect a
class of weapons bearing a certain characteristic when, at the time of
ratification, citizens had no concept of that characteristic or how it
fit within the right to bear arms.120

Thus, because the regulation did not seem to impermissibly burden
the defendant’s Second Amendment rights, the Third Circuit halted
its analysis at step one.121 Consequently, the way courts embracing
this test categorize challenged legislation plays a major role in
whether the law is subjected to some form of judicial interestbalancing.
Several Circuits, including the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth
and Tenth, have followed the Third Circuit’s lead in employing the

115. See Sobel, supra note 105, at 514.
116. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle
Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185,
195 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 799–801 (10th Cir. 2010).
117. Cf. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1264.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1273–74.
120. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 2010).
121. Id. at 95. The court proceeded to analyze and uphold the law under
intermediate scrutiny, however, in order to fully foreclose the defendant’s argument.
Id. at 95–101.
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Marzzarella test.122 While some Circuits place more emphasis on the
history of the Second Amendment than others, each employs some
form of the two-step test articulated in Marzzarella.123 Thus, each
Circuit using the test enjoys some ability to customize its application
while adhering to the same framework. This local laterality, along
with a pattern of nationwide use since the test’s inception, could
explain the widespread acceptance of this approach among circuit
courts.
D. Reframing the Question: Judge Kavanaugh Dissents
Despite the Marzzarella two-step test’s burgeoning popularity,
alarmingly few courts have explained how the second part of the test
comports with Heller and McDonald’s rejection of interest-balancing
inquiries.124 Courts utilizing this test seem unwilling to acknowledge
the Supreme Court’s clear warning against the use of idiosyncratic
judicial evaluations of the right to keep and bear arms.125
Additionally, the indeterminacy of the “consensus candidate” of
evaluation—intermediate scrutiny—leaves the door open for just this
type of idiosyncratic analysis in an area rife with political controversy
and emotional tension.126 In 2011, Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C.
Circuit chose to lead the charge against the use of an interestbalancing analysis for the Second Amendment in Heller II.127 In
doing so, he opened the door to a different method of analysis for
lower courts considering the issue.
Heller II concerned the District’s renewed attempts to limit local
possession of firearms. Post-Heller, the District enacted the Firearms
Registration Amendment Act of 2008 (FRA), which (1) required a
strict firearms registration procedure and (2) prohibited both the
registration of “assault weapons” and the possession of magazines

122. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 864, 874 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2012); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno,
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 799–801 (10th
Cir. 2010).
123. Cf. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876–77 (describing only recent threats posed by guns
in Baltimore to justify limitations on concealed carry); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91
(examining the deep historical roots behind a New York law requiring “good and
proper cause” to obtain a concealed carry permit).
124. Miller supra note 39, at 870–71.
125. Id. (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045–56 (2010)).
126. Id. at 871.
127. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269–96 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
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with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition.128 The
registration provision was extensive, requiring, among several other
things, a demonstration of knowledge of the District’s laws and
submitting each pistol to be registered “for a ballistics identification
procedure.”129 The definition of “assault weapons” as employed by
the District included certain brands and models of semi-automatic
rifles, pistols, and shotguns (including the Colt AR-15 series of rifles),
as well as semi-automatic firearms with certain features regardless of
make and model, such as thumbhole stocks.130 The Heller II plaintiffs
were each denied applications to register firearms based upon
restrictions in the FRA. Dick Heller himself was denied registration
of both a semi-automatic rifle and a pistol containing a fifteen-round
magazine.131
Judge Douglas Ginsburg, writing for the D.C. Circuit majority,
utilized the two-step approach articulated in Marzzarella to analyze
the registration requirements as to handguns.132 Ginsburg divided the
He
requirements into two categories: “basic” and “novel.”133
concluded that the basic registration requirement, as applied to
handguns but not to long guns, fell into the “presumptively lawful”
exception articulated in Heller, and thus only reached the first step of
the Marzzarella analysis.134 Because the basic requirement to register
handguns is “longstanding” and “deeply enough rooted in our
history,” he determined that such a mandate “does not impinge upon
the right protected by the Second Amendment.”135 The majority
asserted that the plaintiffs had failed to rebut the presumptively
lawful nature of the basic registration because they did not show that
the regulation had more than a de minimis effect on their rights.136 In
contrast, Judge Ginsburg subjected the novel registration
requirements to the second step of the Marzzarella analysis.137
Utilizing intermediate scrutiny, the D.C. Circuit remanded these

128. Id. at 1247.
129. Id. at 1248–49.
130. Id. at 1249.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1252–53.
133. Id. at 1253, 1255. The “basic” registration requirement included only the
general requirement to register handguns. “Novel” registration requirements
included modern registration restrictions utilized by the District, such as the
ballistics-identification provision.
134. Id. at 1253–54.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1253.
137. Id. at 1255.

2014]

SECOND AMENDMENT REVIEW

1061

requirements to the district court for further evidentiary proceedings
to give the District an opportunity to “adequately show a substantial
relationship between any of the novel registration requirements and
an important government interest.”138
The Heller II majority then separately addressed the question of
the “assault weapon” and high-capacity magazine ban.139 Applying
the common use test, Judge Ginsburg could not conclusively
determine whether either was entitled to any Second Amendment
protection.140 The court found it clear from the record that both semiautomatic rifles and magazines with a capacity exceeding ten rounds
are in common use among private citizens.141 Nevertheless, the court
could not hold with certainty whether they “are commonly used or
are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting,” and declined to
determine whether the regulation impinged upon the right to keep
and bear arms.142 Because he was reasonably certain that the
prohibitions on both did not substantially burden the plaintiffs’
Second Amendment rights, Judge Ginsburg found it unnecessary to
resolve this question, and thus subjected them to intermediate
scrutiny.143
The court held that the District’s stated interest
supporting the regulation of protecting police officers and controlling
crime was important, and that the prohibition was substantially
related to this interest because assault weapons and high-capacity
magazines are favored by criminals and place law enforcement

138. Id. at 1259–60. The court pointed to the parties’ failure to distinguish between
handguns and long guns in their briefs as an example of a sufficient deficiency in the
record. Id. at 1259.
139. Id. at 1260.
140. Id. at 1261.
141. Id. (reciting statistics from the record revealing that the AR-15 accounted for
14.4% of all rifles produced in the United States for domestic market in 2007. As to
large-capacity magazines, the court cited statistics showing that in 1994, 18% of all
firearms owned by civilians were equipped with magazines holding more than ten
rounds, as well as statistics demonstrating that 4.7 million more such magazines were
imported in the United States between 1995 and 2000).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1261–62. Unlike the ban in Heller I, Judge Ginsburg held, the laws at
issue in Heller II did not “prohibit the possession of the quintessential self-defense
weapon, to wit, the handgun.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, the
Heller II majority did not directly address the frequency with which handguns in the
District contained magazines exceeding ten rounds, and consequently did not
consider whether the challenged statute substantially affected handgun possession
with respect to high-capacity magazines. Furthermore, the Heller II court concluded
that because other guns are available for self-defense besides semi-automatic rifles or
firearms with large-capacity magazines, “the prohibition . . . does not effectively
disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend themselves.” Id. at
1262.
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officials at heightened risk due to their increased firepower.144 Judge
Ginsburg acknowledged Heller’s rejection of interest-balancing tests,
but concluded that heightened scrutiny was not the type of balancing
the Supreme Court had rejected.145
Judge Kavanaugh disagreed with both the majority’s conclusions
and its two-step analysis in dissent, and proposed an entirely new
test.146 According to Judge Kavanaugh, the form of evaluation
developed from Marzzarella is based upon a complete misreading of
the Heller core, which explicitly prohibited the use of balancing tests
like strict or intermediate scrutiny.147 Rather, Heller mandated the
examination of “text, history, and tradition” to both determine the
scope of Second Amendment rights and assess gun legislation.148
Under Judge Kavanaugh’s reading, Heller set forth “precise
guidance” for courts faced with challenges to gun legislation, which
may fall into one of two categories: bans on categories of guns, or
regulations on the sale, possession, or use of guns.149 He focused upon
the common use test for the first category, explaining that legislatures
may ban classes of guns “that have been banned in our ‘historical
tradition’ – namely, guns that are ‘dangerous and unusual’ and thus
are not ‘the sorts of lawful weapons that’ citizens typically ‘possess[]
at home.’”150 Judge Kavanaugh further employed the “presumptively
lawful” exception for the second category, where he opined that the
government “may continue to impose regulations that are traditional,
‘longstanding’ regulations in the United States.”151
Turning to the majority’s analysis, Judge Kavanaugh severely
criticized Judge Ginsburg’s interpretation of Heller’s restriction on
interest-balancing: “The premise of the majority opinion’s more

144. Id. at 1263–64. Judge Ginsburg also suggested that semi-automatic rifles
could fall under Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” exception, because the Heller
Court suggested that military M-16 rifles may be in this category and “it is difficult to
draw meaningful distinctions between the AR-15 and the M-16.” Id. at 1263 (citations
omitted).
145. Id. at 1265. The type of interest-balancing the Heller Court rejected, Judge
Ginsburg stated, was a more nebulous “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing
inquiry’ that would have a court weigh the asserted governmental interests against
the burden the Government would place upon exercise of the Second Amendment
right, a balancing test that is not part of strict or intermediate scrutiny.” Id.
146. Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1271–72 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 627
(2008)).
151. Id. at 1272 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27).
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general point – that Heller’s rejection of balancing tests does not
mean it rejected strict and intermediate scrutiny – is incorrect. Strict
and intermediate scrutiny are balancing tests and thus are necessarily
encompassed by Heller’s more general rejection of balancing.”152 He
traced the evolution of heightened scrutiny through its inception in
First Amendment jurisprudence, noting,
[S]trict and intermediate scrutiny come in a variety of flavors and
are not always applied in the exact same way in all settings . . . . But
they always involve at least some assessment of whether the law in
question is sufficiently important to justify infringement on an
individual constitutional right. That’s balancing.153

While strict and intermediate scrutiny are appropriate and
traditionally utilized in particular scenarios, like substantive due
process and First Amendment cases, Judge Kavanaugh cited several
areas where such analysis is not invoked to show that heightened
scrutiny is not a one-size-fits-all inquiry.154 He further pointed to the
Heller majority’s express rejection of the intermediate scrutiny
analysis proposed in Justice Breyer’s dissent in that case.155 Judge
Kavanaugh additionally reminded the majority that “in Heller, the
Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision, which similarly
declined to adopt a strict or intermediate scrutiny test.”156 In sum, it
“would hardly have been unusual or unthinkable for the Supreme
Court to set forth a Second Amendment test based on text, history
and tradition – rather than a heightened scrutiny approach.”157
Applying the “text, history, and tradition” formulation, Judge
Kavanaugh concluded that both restrictions imposed by the District
were unconstitutional.158 As to the registration requirements, he
argued that they failed to fall into the “presumptively lawful”
category because restrictions of the type utilized by the District are
not “longstanding.”159
The majority’s conclusion that basic
registration has deep historical roots, he contended, was based upon a

152. Id. at 1280 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1282 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1283 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Kavanaugh pointed specifically to the
Jury Trial Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, the
Confrontation Clause, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and the Habeas
Corpus Clause as examples of areas where the Supreme Court has not used strict or
intermediate scrutiny. Id.
155. Id. at 1278 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1283–84 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1283 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1285 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1291 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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flawed reading.160 Though he conceded that colonial militia members
were required to register some of their weapons, Kavanaugh pointed
out that such laws did not apply to all citizens and required
militiamen to submit only one, rather than all of, their firearms for
inspection.161
As such, he found the District’s registration
requirement unconstitutional because it “is not part of the tradition of
gun regulation in the United States; it is the most stringent such law in
the Nation; and it is significantly more onerous than traditional
licensing requirements or record-keeping requirements imposed only
on gun sellers.”162 Because the District’s registration requirements
were not “longstanding” and thus not presumptively lawful,
Kavanaugh had little trouble dismissing them as unconstitutional.
Judge Kavanaugh reached a similar conclusion evaluating the
constitutionality of the District’s “assault weapons” ban.163 He
characterized the ban on semi-automatic rifles as identical to the
clearly unconstitutional handgun ban struck down in Heller.164
Acknowledging the District’s concern about the use of semiautomatic rifles in crime, Judge Kavanaugh then pointed to an
underlying logical flaw:
In support of its law, [the District] suggests that semi-automatic
rifles are ‘offensive’ and not just ‘defensive.’ But that is plainly true
of semi-automatic handguns as well . . . and yet the Supreme Court
held semi-automatic handguns to be constitutionally protected.
Moreover, it’s hard to see why, if a gun is effective for ‘offense,’ it
might not also be effective for ‘defense.’ . . . There is no reason to
think that semi-automatic rifles are not effective for self-defense in
the home, which Heller explained is the core purpose of the Second
Amendment right.165

Kavanaugh was also dismissive of the majority’s claim that
individuals could own other types of weapons for self-defense, and
thus were not entitled to semi-automatic rifles. “In Heller,” he
contended, “[the District] argued that it could ban handguns because
individuals could still own rifles. That argument failed.”166 He found
no difference between the present scenario and said failed argument:
“Here, [the District] contends that it can ban rifles because

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1293 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1294 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1290 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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individuals can still own handguns. [The District’s] at-least-you-canstill-possess-other-kinds-of-guns argument is no more persuasive this
time around.”167 Because the majority could not “persuasively
explain why semi-automatic handguns are constitutionally protected
but semi-automatic rifles are not,” Kavanaugh found the “assault
weapons” legislation no more valid than the District’s handgun ban in
Heller.168
Judge Kavanaugh further proposed an answer to some of the
questions raised in the wake of Heller regarding new technology and
the common use test.169 He concluded that the constitutionality of
novel technology was still easily resolved under the “text, history, and
tradition” test, even though “there obviously will not be a history or
tradition of banning such weapons or imposing such regulations.”170
The appropriate analysis in such situations under Judge Kavanaugh’s
approach would be to “reason by analogy from history and tradition,”
as courts have done in the face of emerging technology in First and
Fourth Amendment cases.171 This approach takes some indirect steps
towards resolving the question of who the common user should be,
because it allows courts to identify common users of particular
weapons (like military firearms) in the past. Troublingly, this analysis
does little to resolve the circularity problem for advanced
technologies that may have no historical analogue. Indeed, Judge
Kavanaugh himself admitted that “applying constitutional principles
to novel modern conditions can be difficult and leave close questions
at the margins.”172 But, he argued, “that is hardly unique to the
Second Amendment. It is an essential component of judicial
decisionmaking [sic] under our enduring Constitution.”173
E.

Recent Judicial Approval of the Kavanaugh Approach

Though of recent vintage, Judge Kavanaugh’s method of
interpretation of Second Amendment rights using text, history, and
tradition has garnered explicit judicial support in at least one instance
since Heller II’s decision. In Gowder v. City of Chicago, the
Northern District of Illinois considered the constitutionality of an
ordinance prohibiting the approval of a firearm permit for an

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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applicant convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm.174 The
plaintiff, Shawn Gowder, was convicted in 1995 of felony unlawful use
of a weapon under Illinois’ Safe Neighborhood Act.175 In 1999, the
Illinois Supreme Court found the Safe Neighborhood Act
unconstitutional, and Gowder’s conviction was reduced to a nonviolent misdemeanor.176 At the time, the City of Chicago required
persons living within the city to obtain a permit in order to possess a
weapon in their homes.177 Chicago residents could not obtain the
requisite permit if they had been convicted of unlawful use a firearm,
even if the offense was a non-violent misdemeanor.178 Gowder
applied for a permit, which the City of Chicago denied because of his
previous misdemeanor charge.179 He subsequently challenged the
denial and the constitutionality of the statute.180
Reviewing Gowder’s motion for summary judgment, Judge DerYeghiayan employed Kavanaugh’s “text, history, and tradition”
method of analysis.181 He hinged his discussion upon the
“presumptively lawful” exception to Second Amendment protection
articulated in Heller, which approved of longstanding and traditional
laws barring felons from firearm possession.182 Judge Der-Yeghiayan
concluded that statutes prohibiting all criminals from gun
possession—without
differentiating
between
felons
and
misdemeanants, or violent or nonviolent criminals—did “not find a
valid foothold in statutory history,” and thus could not find safe
harbor as presumptively lawful.183 The Chicago statute, he described,
impermissibly
lumps together non-violent misdemeanants, violent misdemeanants,
and felons. While the Supreme Court has historically allowed
prohibitions to certain individuals, including felons and those
convicted of violent crimes, at the time the Second Amendment was
passed . . . it was not intended to apply to non-violent
misdemeanants, nor has this group of individuals traditionally been
barred from exercising their inherent Second Amendment rights.184

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1113–14.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1121 (citing United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 1122.
Id.
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Judge Der-Yeghiayan also found it problematic that the Chicago
statute regulated firearm possession in the home by non-violent
misdemeanants, clearly infringing upon the Heller core.185 Further, he
concluded that even if the Kavanaugh approach was inappropriate
and an interest-balancing approach had to be applied, the proper
standard would be strict scrutiny, and the Chicago regulation would
fail.186
F.

The Puzzle of High-Capacity Magazine Restrictions

High-capacity magazines have emerged as a new frontier for
government regulation of firearms and pose unique analytical
questions. Unlike guns themselves, magazines do not pose a threat
standing alone, nor do they bear any relation to an individual’s ability
to carry or initially obtain a gun. But the potentially lethal
combination of guns and high-capacity magazines have left these
items subject to increasing legislation.187 As such, high-capacity
magazines provide a particularly useful vehicle for finding the proper
method of analysis for Second Amendment rights. The question and
utility of magazine size limitation has come into sharp focus in the
wake of mass shootings like those in Aurora and Sandy Hook.188
Several states, such as Connecticut189 and New York190 have rushed to
pass laws severely curtailing the legal size of magazines, leaving the
185. Id. at 1122–23. Judge Der-Yeghiayan opined that:
This is a case where a person is required by the City of Chicago to apply for
a Chicago Firearm Permit in order to legally possess a firearm at home for
self-defense, which is a core Second Amendment constitutional
right . . . . The same Constitution that protects the people’s right to keep and
bear arms prohibits this type of indiscriminate and arbitrary government
regulation . . . any attempt to dilute or restrict a core constitutional right
with justifications that do not have a basis in history and tradition is
inherently suspect.

Id.
186. Id. at 1123.
187. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-301 (West 2013); 2013 CONN. ACTS
13-3 (Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE § 7-2506.01 (2013); 2013 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2230
(McKinney).
188. Complete Coverage on Theater Shooting in Aurora, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/us/colorado-shooting (last visited Mar. 15, 2014);
Mark Follman & Gavin Aronsen, “A Killing Machine”: Half of All Mass Shooters
MOTHER
JONES
(Jan.
30,
2013),
Use
High-Capacity
Magazines,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/high-capacity-magazines-massshootings; Sandy Hook Shooting: What Happened?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to
articles detailing the gun control debate).
189. 2013 CONN. ACTS 13-3 (Reg. Sess.).
190. 2013 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2230 (McKinney).
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term “high-capacity magazine” itself without a cognizable national
definition. Some states limit magazine sizes to seven rounds of
ammunition, though the general consensus among states restricting
magazine size hovers near ten rounds.191
While mass shootings of the sort seen recently are truly horrific
incidents to be warded against, it is not clear that magazines over the
common ten-round limit would be materially more dangerous than
magazines of a smaller size.192 Although a gun with a larger magazine
is theoretically more lethal than one with a smaller magazine, the
overwhelming majority of gun crime involves far fewer shots than ten,
or even seven.193 The fear that larger magazines will enable more
mass shootings may be a similarly misplaced concern. Indeed,
“[g]iven that removing a magazine and inserting a new one takes only
a few seconds, a mass murderer—especially one armed with a backup
gun—would hardly be stymied by the magazine size limit.”194 Further,
in the extremely rare instance where an individual would need more
than ten rounds for self-defense, magazine size limitations require the
defender to engage in the additional time and preparation of having a
spare magazine available and reloading his or her gun.195 Though
such hypotheticals are certainly grim, it is clear after Heller and
McDonald that limitations on individual Second Amendment rights
are to be seriously evaluated under all circumstances.
Because Heller is silent as to high-capacity magazine bans, courts
are left to independently evaluate the bans’ constitutionality. First,
courts must determine whether high-capacity magazines readily fall
into one of the two exceptions articulated in Heller. Bans on highcapacity magazines are neither longstanding nor deeply rooted in
history.196 Additionally, the “presumptively lawful” exception does
not appear to cover high-capacity magazines, as they do not fall in
one of the example categories articulated by Justice Scalia.197

191. CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: LAWS ON HIGH CAPACITY
MAGAZINES (2013), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-0039.htm.
192. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1443, 1489 (2009).
193. Id. The average number of rounds fired in the course of a criminal shooting
involving a semiautomatic pistol is between 3.2 and 3.7 rounds. Another Ban on
“High-Capacity” Magazines?, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (2013),
http://www.nssf.org/factsheets/PDF/HighCapMag.pdf.
194. Volokh, supra note 192, at 1489.
195. See supra text accompanying note 191.
196. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
197. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
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However, whether high-capacity magazine bans may be valid under
the common use test requires more in-depth analysis.
To determine whether a given weapon is valid under the common
use test, scholars have proposed that it must meet two separate
requirements: quantity and legitimacy.198 The “quantity” requirement
means that the weapon must be either “numerically common” (widely
owned) or “functionally common” (functionally identical to other
common guns).199 The “legitimacy” requirement means that the
weapon must be possessed for lawful purposes, like self-defense.200
High-capacity magazines (defined tentatively as magazines capable of
holding more than ten rounds of ammunition) are certainly
numerically common; by some estimates, more than thirty million
detachable magazines in circulation in the United States can
accommodate more than thirty rounds.201 Because high-capacity
magazines operate the way traditional magazines have in semiautomatic weapons for over a century, they are also functionally
common.202 Additionally, high-capacity magazines serve an identical
purpose to their smaller counterparts: supplying ammunition to a
functional firearm. Thus, they are ideally suited in any capacity to a
lawful purpose like self-defense. As such, although they are not
“arms” in the traditional sense, high-capacity magazines are, by
analogy, well within the scope of Second Amendment protection
according to Heller.203
Although high-capacity magazines satisfy the broad requirements
of the common use test, to receive the protection offered by Heller
they must be neither “dangerous” nor “unusual.”204 This requirement
poses a far more complicated issue, and one highly influenced by
social attitudes and the “cringe factor” surrounding the use of items
intended to provide a relatively large quantity of ammunition to a
semi-automatic weapon.205
While high-capacity magazines are
198. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 1292–93; Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear
(Robotic) Arms, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 755, 766–67.
199. Johnson, supra note 68, at 1293.
200. Terzian, supra note 198, at 766–67.
201. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 1273-74. National Shooting Sports Foundation,
Another Ban on “High-Capacity” Magazines? (2013), available at
http://www.nssf.org/factsheets/PDF/HighCapMag.pdf. As noted by Judge Ginsburg
in Heller II, “There may well be some capacity above which magazines are not in
common use, but, if so, the record is devoid of evidence as to what that capacity is; in
any event, that capacity surely is not ten.” 670 F.3d at 1261.
202. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 1298.
203. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
204. Id.
205. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 1321-22.
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certainly not “unusual,” there is debate over whether they may
qualify as “dangerous,” with advocates on both sides of the issue.
Those arguing that high-capacity magazines are dangerous and
worthy of exclusion from Second Amendment protection state that
they are “disproportionately involved in the murder of law
enforcement officers and in mass shootings, and have little value for
self-defense or sport.”206 Further, they contend, magazines above a
ten-round capacity are more harmful in self-defense situations due to
“the tendency . . . for defenders to keep firing until all bullets have
been expended, which poses grave risks to others in the household,
passersby, and bystanders.”207 Those who oppose these types of bans
point to the utility of high-capacity magazines in protection
scenarios.208 Without high-capacity magazines, they argue, persons in
a stressful self-defense situation would have to pause in order to
reload the firearm.209 Moreover, responsible ownership of highcapacity magazines, they contend, presents no more of a threat than
ownership of magazines below a smaller mandated number.210
Additionally, proponents of a “non-dangerous” categorization point
to a reduction in violent crime following the expiration of the Federal
Assault Weapons Ban in 2004, which banned magazines capable of
holding over ten rounds.211
The question of new technology and the circularity problem also
plague the question of high-capacity magazine restrictions’
constitutionality.
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which
technological development in after-market magazines for semiautomatic rifles and handguns has created a magazine exceeding ten
rounds that is twenty percent less likely to jam when fired rapidly.212

206. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining the District’s
argument in favor of the high-capacity magazine ban).
207. Id. at 1264.
208. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 192, at 1489; Another Ban on “High-Capacity”
Magazines?, supra note 193.
209. See, e.g., Gene Hoffman, High Capacity Magazines Are Needed for SelfDefense, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/debateclub/should-high-capacity-ammunition-magazines-be-banned/high-capacitymagazines-are-needed-for-self-defense;
Another Ban on “High-Capacity”
Magazines?, supra note 193.
210. See Hoffman, supra note 209; Jennifer Steinhauer, Pro-Gun Lawmakers Are
Open to Limits on Size of Magazines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A1.
211. Another Ban on “High-Capacity” Magazines?, supra note 193.
212. After-market high-capacity magazines notoriously experience jamming
problems. For instance, the gunman in the Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting
discarded one of the rifles he brought to the scene because the drum magazine he
purchased for it failed to feed bullets into the chamber. Susan Candiotti, Source:
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This advancement creates an admittedly more lethal weapon, but also
one that is both more reliable in an extreme self-defense scenario and
more useful for endeavors like hunting or sport. Laws banning
magazines with this advancement would prevent a more predictable
and sophisticated product from becoming a weapon in “common
use,” denying it Second Amendment protection under Heller. If
courts do not label high-capacity magazines “dangerous” within the
meaning of the Heller exception, laws banning the advanced
magazines would impinge on the individual rights to keep and bear
arms for self-defense. Consequently, courts would have to engage in
an extensive case-by-case inquiry to evaluate the constitutionality of
all legislation addressing all future magazine developments.
Conversely, if courts deem high-capacity magazines “dangerous,”
banning the advanced magazines presents no constitutional problems
under Heller, and laws banning such products could freely stand.
Under this model, any technological advancements in magazine
technology conceivably could never enjoy Second Amendment
protection. As this example illustrates, high-capacity magazine
restrictions present a unique and complicated constitutional problem,
and one that has yet to be thoroughly analyzed by lower courts after
Heller, McDonald, and Heller II.
III. TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION, NOT A TWO-STEP TEST
Since 2008, judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment has
clearly undergone major change. Because the Supreme Court failed
to articulate a clear standard of review for the individual right to keep
and bear arms, courts have necessarily struggled to settle on a single
method. As discussed in Part I, two primary analytical routes have
emerged: the two-step test articulated in Marzzarella, and the “text,
history, and tradition” test established in Judge Kavanaugh’s Heller II
dissent and approved of in Gowder. This Note proposes that the
Kavanaugh approach offers several advantages over the Marzzarella
test, including increased judicial flexibility, predictability of result,
ease of use, and adherence to established Supreme Court precedent.
This Note then illustrates the benefits of the Kavanaugh approach
over the Marzzarella two-step by applying both tests to high-capacity
magazine restrictions, and determines that the Kavanaugh approach
most readily provides a solution to the complications posed by such

Colorado Shooter’s Rifle Jammed During Rampage, CNN (July 22, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/22/us/colorado-shooting-investigation/index.html.
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legislation. Finally, this Note acknowledges the flaws inherent in the
Kavanaugh approach, raising questions for future research.
A. The Kavanaugh Approach Permits Increased Judicial
Flexibility
The first benefit the Kavanaugh test provides over an interestbalancing analysis is increased judicial flexibility.213 Under both
intermediate and strict scrutiny, courts are bound to a set inquiry
developed with an eye to constitutional provisions that have
developed along far different jurisprudential lines than the Second
Amendment. Conversely, under the Kavanaugh approach, judges are
permitted to analyze the historical application and traditional roots of
the precise legislation the state seeks to impose.214 Contrary to the
Heller II majority’s argument that a text, history, and tradition
approach would place too many gun laws in jeopardy, this approach
actually permits courts to uphold more restrictions than they would
under an interest-balancing test; the only restriction is that the
challenged legislation finds some footing in American history.215 This
type of flexibility removes concern about judges legislating from the
bench, because a case-by-case incorporation of traditional gun
restrictions allows the judiciary to remove personal politics from the
equation and simply focus upon long-standing evidence. As a result,
the Kavanaugh approach gives judges a greater range of
consideration than an interest-balancing approach, which would
require them to categorize and compare state interests that are often
nebulous and difficult to define.
B.

The Kavanaugh Approach Creates More Predictable Results

While the Kavanaugh approach offers more flexibility, its emphasis
on history and tradition yields far more predictable results than
interest-balancing analysis. State legislatures will have a far better
understanding of what types of restrictions are constitutionally
permissible under a standard approach focusing on a well-established
body of evidence. Further, observing text, history, and tradition does
not require litigants to engage in predictive judicial mind reading
when presenting a challenge to a particular restriction. While the
three factors the Kavanaugh approach relies upon can be difficult to
define in some circumstances, they are certainly easier to analyze than

213. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 1272 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 1274 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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the relative utility of a stated government interest. While under the
Marzzarella approach judges only need to engage in interestbalancing if they determine that the challenged legislation infringes
on a core Second Amendment right, such analysis requires some level
of subjective judicial characterization at both junctures.216 The
Kavanaugh approach thus offers more predictable results as it goes
further towards removing personal judicial predilection from the
analysis of a particular Second Amendment case.
C.

The Kavanaugh Approach Offers Significant Ease of Use

In the same vein, the Kavanaugh approach offers the additional
benefit of judicial ease of use. While certainly not all judges prefer to
engage in extensive textual or historical analysis, Kavanaugh’s test
provides a simple formula for those that do. Rather than apply a twoprong test, courts could simply compare the historical background of
the challenged regulation and the text of the Second Amendment.
This approach thus avoids the problem of having to articulate an
appropriate standard of review, which the Supreme Court declined to
set in Heller and McDonald.217 As Judge Kavanaugh explained,
In sum, our task as a lower court here is narrow and constrained by
precedent. We need not squint to divine some hidden meaning from
Heller about what tests to apply. Heller was up-front about the role
of text, history, and tradition in Second Amendment analysis—and
about the absence of a role for judicial interest balancing or
assessment of costs and benefits of gun regulations.218

As such, this test allows reviewing courts to execute the “narrow
task” presented to them, and avoid creating or adhering to a standard
the Supreme Court did not intend. This immensely simplifies the
judicial task, and creates a uniform choice for courts from all corners
of the country that may face differing types of legislation. The test set
216. See Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117–18 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
The problem of subjective analysis is compounded by the fact that some judges using
the Marzzarella standard feel compelled to apply some level of interest-balancing
analysis to challenged legislation, even if they do not feel that the statute infringes on
a core Second Amendment right; this inserts unnecessary analysis and undercuts the
possibility of purely objective application of this type of examination. See, e.g., Nat’l
Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d
185, 205 (5th Cir. 2012). Some courts, like the Fourth Circuit in Woollard v.
Gallagher, have dispensed with the first part of the Marzzarella test in its entirety and
proceed to analyze Second Amendment cases solely under intermediate scrutiny. See
712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
217. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality opinion);
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008).
218. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1285 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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forth in Marzzarella creates complication in an area already plagued
with uncertainty; the Kavanaugh approach, on the other hand, creates
a relatively uniform standard. As Justice Breyer noted in dissent in
McDonald, “judges do not know the answers to the kinds of
empirically based questions that will often determine the need for
particular forms of gun regulation. Nor do they have readily available
‘tools’ for finding and evaluating the technical material submitted by
others.”219 Instead of requiring judges to engage in this form of
analysis, the Kavanaugh approach allows judges to examine readily
available text and historical material.
D. The Kavanaugh Approach Is More Consistent with Supreme
Court Precedent
Above all other benefits, the Kavanaugh approach is the most loyal
to the standards articulated by the Supreme Court in both Heller and
McDonald. As discussed in Part I, the Court in both instances
seemed to reject a form of interest-balancing analysis for the Second
Amendment.220 While the Court has been criticized for failing to
articulate a standard of scrutiny for gun legislation (even from within
its own ranks),221 the fact that it twice rejected the opportunity to do
so indicates that such a standard is a poor fit.222 At the very least, the
Court’s reluctance to choose intermediate or strict scrutiny cannot be
seen as an invitation for lower courts to self-select. What the Court
did explicitly utilize in both cases, as Kavanaugh rightly focused upon,
was the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment.223 Nor
would such a focus be out of bounds for constitutional analysis, as

219. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3128 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 3047 (plurality opinion); Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (“A
constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no
constitutional guarantee at all.”).
221. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How is a court to determine
whether a particular firearm regulation . . . is consistent with the Second
Amendment? . . . The majority is wrong when it says the District’s law is
unconstitutional ‘[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated rights.’ How could that be?”) (internal citations omitted).
222. As described by Darrell A.H. Miller, one of the gravest problems facing the
use of interest-balancing in Second Amendment cases is that
the quintessential government interest, public safety, has no special bearing
on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms . . . . So, even if a court were
to analyze a certain regulation using a forbidden balancing test, it is unclear
what weight, if any, public safety adds to the scale.
Miller, supra note 39, at 865–66.
223. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1285 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

2014]

SECOND AMENDMENT REVIEW

1075

Seventh Amendment jurisprudence shows by analogy.224 Indeed, the
approach most consistent with Supreme Court precedent seems to be
one that “depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned
analysis rather than a variety of vague ethico-political First Principles
whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction the
judges favor.”225 The prime advantage of the Kavanaugh approach is
its close adherence to the way the U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted the Constitution.
E.

Applying the Kavanaugh Approach to High-Capacity
Magazine Restrictions

As with any proposed method of analysis, practical application
often reveals the realistic benefits and flaws of forms of judicial
reasoning that theoretical discussion may not touch upon. As noted
in Part II, high-capacity magazines present a variety of critical Second
Amendment questions, and the constitutionality of laws restricting
them remain far from clear. This Note proposes that comparing the
results of both the Kavanaugh approach and the popular Marzzarella
test to laws banning high-capacity magazines demonstrates that
examination based on “text, history, and tradition” produces a clear,
predictable conclusion most faithful to the principles articulated in
Heller and McDonald.226 Further, applying the Kavanaugh approach
to the puzzling problems presented by high-capacity magazines
presents an instructive example of the positive aspects of such
analysis, as well as potential drawbacks and questions for future
research.
Under either approach, courts must first determine whether highcapacity magazine restrictions impinge upon an individual’s Second
Amendment right to bear arms. If such restrictions do not intrude on
those rights, under either form of examination, the analysis ends. A
particular regulation must impermissibly burden a Second
Amendment right to be unconstitutional.227
To make this
determination, it is useful for the court to define a law prohibiting the
possession of high-capacity magazines as prohibiting or limiting.228

224. Miller, supra note 39, at 929.
225. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring).
226. As discussed in Part I, there is no clear legislative definition for how many
rounds a high-capacity magazine must contain. For the purposes of consistency, this
Note defines a ban on high-capacity magazines as a law prohibiting magazines
exceeding the common standard of ten rounds.
227. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (plurality opinion).
228. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 1264.
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Prohibiting statutes are far more likely to undercut an individual’s
fundamental right to keep and bear arms, and thus are immediately
constitutionally suspect.229 Bans on high-capacity magazines must
almost certainly fall into the category of prohibiting statutes. Like the
handgun ban in Miller, the absolute restriction on city firing ranges in
Ezell, and the limitation on non-violent misdemeanant possession in
Gowder, an embargo on magazines exceeding a certain size directly
encroaches on an individual’s ability to engage in self-defense.230
First, limitations on high-capacity magazines necessarily mean that
no individual may possess a magazine exceeding as few as seven
rounds.231 Consequently, in an emergency situation that person would
be impeded by having to stop and re-load to fend off an attacker.232
Such legislation makes no distinction between the home, where the
right to self-defense is at its apex, and the outside world, where the
Second Amendment is more open to manipulation.233 As such, laws
banning magazines over a certain capacity—particularly when that
number is low compared to the capacity of magazines in wide
circulation in the United States—both directly affect and infringe
upon an individual’s right to protect him or herself in his or her
domicile.234 While it is certainly arguable that such legislation only
adds “friction” to keeping and bearing firearms, this contention loses
force when examined in light of the burden it places upon self-defense
in the home. Certainly, it is unlikely that an individual will need more
than ten bullets to defend his or her property, but the scenario is far
from inconceivable.235 Viewed in this light, laws restricting highcapacity magazines most assuredly place a greater burden on selfdefense than other restrictions that courts have found constitutionally

229. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d
684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[B]roadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second
Amendment right . . . are categorically unconstitutional.”).
230. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708–09; Gowder v. City of
Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
231. See Volokh, supra note 192, at 1489.
232. See id.
233. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628.
234. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1260–61 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Another Ban on
“High-Capacity” Magazines?, supra note 193.
235. See Yih-Chau Chang, High Capacity Magazines and Their Critical Role in
Lawful Self-Defense, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/
article/high-capacity-magazines-and-their-critical-role-lawful-self-defense (describing
a Tucson homeowner who successfully warded off four armed burglars using a highcapacity magazine); Stephen Hunter, Why 33 Rounds Make Sense in a Defensive
Weapon, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/02/04/AR2011020407083.html.
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troubling, like the ban on local firing ranges in Ezell. Consequently,
legislation eliminating the right to possess magazines of prevalent
sizes236—like ten rounds—must be seen as prohibiting statutes
impinging upon the Second Amendment.
The next step in determining whether a law prohibiting highcapacity magazines infringes upon individual Second Amendment
rights is finding whether such legislation falls under one of the Heller
exceptions. As a threshold matter, high-capacity magazine bans do
not fall into the “presumptively lawful” exception, as there is no
longstanding American tradition of limiting magazines of roughly ten
rounds. While the Federal Assault Weapons Ban created such a
magazine limit, it was not enacted until 1994, and expired without
renewal only ten years later.237 This is a far cry from the century-old
types of restrictions discussed under the “presumptively lawful”
exception, such as laws prohibiting gun possession by felons or the
mentally ill.238 While the list of “presumptively lawful” legislation in
Heller was clearly not intended to be exhaustive, it was intended to
exempt only well-established laws regulating firearms.239 Because
there is no historical pattern of outlawing magazines approximating
ten rounds, such a prohibition cannot realistically be said to be
“presumptively lawful” according to the Supreme Court.
The question of whether high-capacity magazines fall into the
common use exception is a far more complex one. To enjoy Second
Amendment protection, high-capacity magazines cannot be qualified
as either “dangerous” or “unusual.”240 Some form of objective
assessment or comparison is necessary to determine whether
magazines approximating ten rounds fall into one or both of these
categories. The United States Army Judge Advocate General Corps
(JAG) conducted a useful study for this endeavor in 1997, and
compared the lethality of the traditional shotgun, the rifle, and the
machine gun in order to guide equipment selection in future combat
operations.241 To a range of seventy-five yards, the shotgun clearly
emerged as the deadliest of all options.242 At a range of thirty yards,

236. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261.
237. VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42957, FEDERAL ASSAULT
WEAPONS BAN: LEGAL ISSUES (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R42957.pdf.
238. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
239. Id. at 627 n.26.
240. Id. at 627.
241. See W. Hays Parks, Joint Service Combat Shotgun Program, 1997 ARMY
LAW. 16, 18.
242. See id.
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the probability of hitting a man-sized target with a shotgun is twice as
good as assault rifles, and nearly twice as good as machine guns.243
Further, the use of a shotgun at close range “increases the probability
that targeted enemy combatants may be struck by more than a single
projectile.”244 JAG concluded that even in the face of alternatives like
the assault rifle and the machine gun, shotguns retain significant
military necessity in the modern era.245 Further studies have
consistently confirmed that semi-automatic assault rifles are
“demonstrably inferior” from a lethality standpoint to shotguns.246
Shotguns have enjoyed wide general approval from state
legislatures; even the expansive ban imposed by the District in Heller
permitted their use.247 No court examining a Second Amendment
challenge has ever permitted a law restricting individual possession of
the traditional shotgun. Accordingly, it appears to be a valid
conclusion that shotguns are not “dangerous” or “unusual” weapons
to be prohibited by the common use test. Objective analysis reveals
that the shotgun is significantly more deadly at a seventy-yard range
than a semi-automatic assault rifle, the type of weapon used in the
Newtown and Aurora shootings.248 A traditional shotgun loaded with
six rounds of 00 buckshot ammunition, which is both widely
commercially available and commonly used for hunting,249 sends nine
0.33-inch projectiles towards a target with a single trigger pull.250 A
semi-automatic rifle sends only one bullet towards a target per trigger

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 20.
Id.
See id.
See Johnson, supra note 68, at 1301; David B. Kopel, Guns, Gangs and
Preschools: Moving Beyond Conventional Solutions to Confront Juvenile Violence, 1
BARRY L. REV. 63, 80 (2000).
247. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 696 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. See Michael Pearson, Gunman Turns “Batman” Screening Into Real-Life
Horror Film, CNN (July 20, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/us/coloradotheater-shooting/index.html; Sandy Hook Shooting: What Happened?, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline (last visited Mar. 15,
2014).
249. See, e.g., Firearms & Ammunition, WALMART, http://www.walmart.com/
browse/shooting/firearms-ammunition/4125_1107532_1088608/?_refineresult=true&
facet=category%3AShotgun+Ammunition (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); Shotgun
Ammunition,
CABELA’S,
http://www.cabelas.com/catalog/browse/shotgunammunition/_/N-1100191+4294751474/Ne4294751474?WTz_l=SBC%3BBRprd734677&WTz_st=GuidedNav&WTz_stype=GN
U (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
250. See
Firearms Tutorial: Ballistics, UNIV. UTAH SCH. MED.,
http://library.med.utah.edu/WebPath/TUTORIAL/GUNS/GUNBLST.html.
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pull.251 A shotgun loaded with six slugs sends fifty-four projectiles
downrange with six trigger pulls; by contrast, a rifle loaded with a
thirty-round magazine produces only thirty projectiles with thirty
trigger pulls. Thus, from this standpoint, even a rifle equipped with a
magazine far exceeding ten rounds sends fewer projectiles towards a
target with greater effort than the shotgun, which has been
consistently legislatively sanctioned. Though discussion of the
relative lethality of shotguns and semi-automatic rifles loaded with
any amount of ammunition may be difficult, states must make
rational and constitutional discriminations when drafting gun laws.
Because objective comparison demonstrates that even rifles equipped
with very high-capacity magazines are less dangerous at close range
than lawful shotguns, high-capacity magazines cannot logically fall
into the “dangerous and unusual” category and out of the protective
sphere of Heller.
Since high-capacity magazines do not fall under the exceptions
delineated by the Supreme Court, laws limiting them must be
examined under the core principles of Heller to determine any
Second Amendment infringement. Under the Kavanaugh approach,
this task is one both “narrow and constrained by precedent” for lower
courts.252 Since high-capacity magazine restrictions of the type
recently passed in many states are qualified as prohibiting statutes, a
court must simply determine whether they are “sufficiently rooted in
text, history, and tradition [as to be] consistent with the Second
Amendment individual right.”253 Even cursory analysis reveals that
legislative bans on ten-round magazines are hardly deeply rooted.
The most significant recent regulation on high-capacity magazines
was not passed until the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban, which
expired in 2004 and did little to curb the use of assault weapons in
violent crimes.254 Most states do not ban magazines with capacities as
low as ten, and most firearms come factory-standard with magazines
exceeding that size.255 Indeed, the popular AR-15 rifle has come

251. See id.
252. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
253. Id. The text of the Second Amendment is silent as to the permissibility of
high-capacity magazines; thus, textual analysis is unnecessary in this instance. See
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
254. See Rick Jervis, Gun Control Advocates Target High-Capacity Magazines,
USA TODAY, Jul. 31, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/201207-31/gun-control-colorado-theater-shooting/56621536/1.
255. See Gene Hoffman, High Capacity Magazines Are Needed for Self-Defense,
US NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/debate-
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equipped with a standard thirty-round magazine since its introduction
in 1963.256 Thus, as the Heller II majority had no trouble recognizing,
there is no historical or traditional state restriction on magazines
holding as few as ten rounds.257 Absent any showing of text, history,
or tradition supporting high-capacity magazine bans, these laws
clearly infringe upon individual Second Amendment rights under the
Kavanaugh approach, and are constitutionally impermissible.
F.

Applying the Marzzarella Two-Step Test to High-Capacity
Magazine Restrictions

Under the Marzzarella approach, the constitutionality of highcapacity magazine restrictions is far from clear, and hinges upon
judicial discretion. Interestingly, precise application of the test’s first
step should be the end of the matter for high-capacity magazine
restrictions, as they are prohibiting statutes that do not fall into a
Heller exception and “impose[] a burden on conduct falling within
the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”258 Nevertheless, a
court utilizing the Marzzarella test could easily advance the analysis
to the second step. First, as discussed in Part I, high-capacity
magazine bans can be framed as limiting statutes.259 As such, they
would fall outside analysis under the common use test, and not pose a
significant Second Amendment burden. Second, many courts often
advance challenged legislation to the second step when they are
unsure about the statute’s survival at step one, and in some
circumstances even when they feel that the question is resolvable
without proceeding to step two.260 These factors combine to make it
more likely than not that a court using the Marzzarella approach
would subject high-capacity magazine restrictions to some form of
heightened scrutiny.
By far the most popular option for step two of the Marzzarella test
is intermediate scrutiny, which requires courts to identify whether the
challenged statute is substantially related to an important government

club/should-high-capacity-ammunition-magazines-be-banned/high-capacitymagazines-are-needed-for-self-defense.
256. See id.
257. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261.
258. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
259. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 1264.
260. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 205 (5th Cir. 2012). As discussed above, the Fourth Circuit
seems to have dispensed with step one entirely. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d
865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
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interest.261 Unlike the Kavanaugh approach, the issue of highcapacity magazine bans surviving intermediate scrutiny is largely
unpredictable and highly dependent on the court’s interpretation.
Applying intermediate scrutiny in the Second Amendment context is
particularly problematic because the test lacks the years of
jurisprudence it has enjoyed in other contexts, such as the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Some judges seem to apply intermediate scrutiny with a
thumb on the legislature’s side of the scale, and some with an eye
towards preservation of a strong Second Amendment right.262
Accordingly, it is nearly impossible to say how a particular court
would resolve a dispute over the constitutionality of high-capacity
magazine restrictions when utilizing the Marzzarella approach.
G. High-Capacity Magazine Restriction Hypotheticals Illustrate
the Superiority of the Kavanaugh Approach
The Kavanaugh approach, with its demonstrable predictability of
outcome, is not only favorable but more faithful to the principles
articulated by the Supreme Court. First, and most importantly, the
Court has twice rejected interest-balancing analysis for Second
Amendment cases.263 Judge Ginsburg addressed this obstacle in
Heller II by concluding that intermediate scrutiny is not a form of
interest-balancing, but a simple “assessment of whether a particular
law will serve an important or compelling governmental interest.”264
Despite this ready definition, analysis of the government’s interest in
enacting gun legislation is precisely the type of “judge-empowering
interest-balancing inquiry” that the Supreme Court sought to actively
bar.265 Further, the Heller Court implicitly addressed and denied the
application of intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases by
rejecting Justice Breyer’s approval of the test: “[T]he very
261. See Sobel, supra note 105, at 513–14.
262. Cf. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2012)
(concluding that New York’s substantial interest in crime prevention justified limiting
handgun concealed carry licenses to individuals able to show “proper cause,” a group
defined as those able to demonstrate a need to use the gun for hunting, target
shooting, or actual and articulable self-defense); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d
684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (requiring a “rigorous showing [of the government’s asserted
interest] . . . if not quite ‘strict scrutiny’ [to be] respectful of the individual rights at
issue”) (emphasis added).
263. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality
opinion); Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
264. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
265. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted); see McDonald,
130 S. Ct. at 3050 (plurality opinion).
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enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government . . . the
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really
worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at
all.”266 The Marzzarella approach simply adds judicial discretion to an
already sound evaluation of whether given legislation significantly
impedes individual Second Amendment rights. Because Heller’s
approach takes interest balancing off the table, laws burdening the
individual Second Amendment rights that do not fall into one of the
two specified exceptions are impermissible. As the Heller Court
would likely find high-capacity magazine restrictions unconstitutional,
the clear directive of the Kavanaugh approach is demonstrably more
consistent with the core of the Second Amendment interpretation
established by the Supreme Court.
H. Unresolved Problems Surrounding the Kavanaugh Approach
The Kavanaugh approach is not without flaws. Because it is
grounded in past interpretation of the Second Amendment, it fails to
provide a clear roadmap for dealing with advancements in firearms
technology. The most significant problem the Kavanaugh approach
neglects is the circularity problem. Here, this Note returns to the
hypothetical posed in Part II regarding after-market high-capacity
magazines with a reduced probability of jamming. State legislatures
are ostensibly free to ban these types of magazines, preventing them
from emerging into common use among American citizens. Despite
their similarity (or improvement over) traditional after-market
magazines, laws regulating these products would qualify as limiting
statutes out of the reach of the common use test.267 While a court
could theoretically stretch the Kavanaugh approach to encompass
these types of magazines based on comparison to those in current use,
they would certainly not enjoy the kind of protection that should be
afforded to their outdated counterparts. Further, the point where
technological advancement pushes a particular product into a new
category—one fully distinguishable from what currently exists on the
market—is an imprecise, easily manipulated line. For instance, is a
seven-round magazine that can be constructed at home from a 3D
printer permissible?268 Is one imbued with laser target assistance or
266. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634.
267. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 1273.
268. See Peter Jensen-Haxel, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and
the Right to Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 447, 448 (2012).
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balancing technology sufficiently dissimilar to current magazines as to
be capable of stricter regulation? Because the Kavanaugh approach
focuses solely on the “text, history, and tradition” of the Second
Amendment, it is not equipped to deal with the questions raised by
new products, and could serve to stymie both courts and
manufacturers through legal development in firearms technology.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Kavanaugh approach’s analytical appeal, most federal
courts have declined to accept it.269 The Supreme Court’s consistent
failure to articulate a standard for Second Amendment challenges has
left lower courts floundering, reaching for questionable tests like the
one articulated in Marzzarella to fill the void. By embracing interestbalancing, courts also embrace precisely the problems the Heller
Court intended to ward against. In contrast, the Kavanaugh approach
directly supports the text, history, and tradition of the Second
Amendment that the Supreme Court intended to take into account.
The puzzling problems raised by high-capacity magazine restrictions
perfectly illustrate the benefits of the Kavanaugh approach, and pose
important questions for the future. Through careful analysis and
adherence to precedent, courts and legislatures will be able to most
effectively approach the difficult issues raised by modern Second
Amendment jurisprudence.

269. See Lund, supra note 33, at 1636.

